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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: SUPREME
COURT HOLDS DISTRICT COURTS MAY NOT
ORDER DISCOVERY FOR USE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1782(a) of the United States Code is a federal statute that
gives district courts the power to assist evidence-gathering by “foreign or
international tribunals.”1 For most of its history, federal courts interpreted
the phrase “foreign or international tribunals” in § 1782 as applying only to
governmental bodies such as courts and administrative agencies.2 Beginning
in 2004, however, parties in a range of cases asserted that private international arbitration proceedings also qualified as “foreign or international tribunals” under the statute.3 Private international arbitration in this context
means arbitral proceedings initiated by contractual agreement between private parties to trans-national commercial transactions.4 As a result of these
cases, federal circuit courts diverged on the question of whether § 1782 permits district courts to assist evidence-gathering by parties to private
1
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (providing that “[t]he district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”)
2
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter
NBC] (concluding “when Congress in 1964 enacted the modern version of § 1782, it intended to
cover governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other statesponsored adjudicatory bodies.”); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882
(5th Cir. 1999) (stating 1964 version of § 1782 aimed to facilitate discovery for international government-sanctioned tribunals).
3
See, e.g., In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding private international arbitration
in China was not “foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782); El Paso Corp. v. La Comision
Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App’x 31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009) (reaching same conclusion on private arbitration in Switzerland); In re EWE Gasspeicher GmbH, No. CV 19-MC-109RGA, 2020 WL 1272612, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 17, 2020) (reaching same conclusion on private
arbitration in Germany); Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 730-31 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding private
arbitration in Dubai was “foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782); HRC-Hainan Holding
Co., LLC v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-MC-80277-TSH, 2020 WL 906719, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020)
(reaching same conclusion on private arbitration panel in China).
4
See S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. S 1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 300
(2013) (defining different types of international arbitration). Strong distinguishes international
commercial arbitration, which occurs between private parties, from investment arbitration, which
arises from investment treaties or interstate agreements. Id.
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international arbitrations.5 In June 2022, the Supreme Court resolved the
split in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.6 In a unanimous decision,
the Court held that a “foreign or international tribunal” is one that exercises
governmental authority conferred by a single nation or multiple nations.7
The resolution of the § 1782 split is significant because applying the
statute to private international arbitrations would have opened the door to
expansive, American-style discovery in those processes.8 Parties to international arbitrations already support their claims and defenses with extensive
documentary evidence.9 Subject to the parties’ prior agreement, arbitrators
generally have the power and discretion to order the parties to produce documents or testify.10 But parties generally cannot seek discovery against the
wishes of the opposing party and the arbitral tribunal, particularly discovery
from third parties.11 This reflects the view that the wishes of the parties
should guide the arbitration process, and that it should remain a faster and
more efficient alternative to litigation.12 In recent years, the International
Bar Association’s Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (“IBA Rules”) have become the dominant choice for evidentiary rules

5
See Ted Folkman, Case of the Day: Servotronics v. Rolls-Royce, FOLKMAN LLC (Oct. 10,
2020), https://lettersblogatory.com/2020/10/06/case-of-the-day-servotronics-v-rolls-royce/ (describing circuit split).
6
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *8 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (summarizing holding).
7
See id. (“In sum, we hold that § 1782 requires a “foreign or international tribunal” to be
governmental or intergovernmental.”). ZF Automative was consolidated with another case,
AlixPartners, LLP v. The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, earlier in the
Court’s 2021-2022 term. Id. at *3 (describing factual and procedural background).
8
See Hailey Barnett & R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC:
What the U.S. Supreme Court’s Upcoming Decision on 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Means for International
Construction Arbitration, JD SUPRA (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/servotronics-inc-v-rolls-royce-plc-what-4025904/ (describing implications of Supreme Court’s decision). The term “discovery” refers to the court-mandated production of evidence, including from
third parties, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit in United States courts. Id.
9
See RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION art. 3-6 (INT’L
BAR ASS’N 2010) [hereinafter IBA Rules] (outlining detailed model rules for exchange of documents, witness statements, and expert reports); Conna Weiner, Top 10 Things Practitioners Should
Know About International Arbitration (Boston Bar Ass’n webinar Jan. 21, 2021).
10
See Laurent Vercauteren, The Taking of Documentary Evidence in International Arbitration, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 341, 346 (2012) (noting arbitrators’ disclosure powers).
11
See id. at 350 (noting private arbitral tribunals usually lack authority to order discovery from
third parties).
12
See GEORGE M. VON MEHREN, BEST PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2007), 2007 WL
6082203, at *1, *2 (describing cost-effectiveness of arbitration). Parties view arbitration as efficient because they can set a time limit on the proceedings and allow only limited discovery and
motion practice. Id. Parties can therefore sometimes resolve even complex matters within a year.
Id.
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in international arbitration.13 However, these rules are not universally accepted, particularly by arbitrators from civil law systems who consider them
to be overly influenced by the common-law discovery approach.14 Furthermore, parties and practitioners are increasingly unhappy with the rising cost
of international arbitration.15
This Note offers a critique the ZF Automotive decision from several
perspectives.16 The decision was not a foregone conclusion, given the compelling arguments that existed in favor of a broader interpretation.17 Moreover, the Court’s earlier § 1782 decision, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., already provided district courts with a four-factor analytical
framework to assess § 1782 requests from any tribunal.18 If the Court
adopted the broader interpretation, district courts could still screen requests
from private tribunals using the Intel factors, notably whether the tribunal
was receptive to U.S. assistance and whether the discovery request was unduly burdensome.19 But although the ZF Automotive holding was not inevitable, both the statute’s language and legislative history support the Court’s
interpretation of § 1782.20 The decision also avoids creating more discovery
rights for parties to international arbitrations than are available to domestic
parties under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).21 Notably, the ZF Automotive decision did not weigh in on the argument that § 1782 discovery
would frustrate the efficiency of international arbitration.22 The Court had

13
See Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 346 (noting “a more ‘international’ approach has evolved
over the past few decades through the use of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence.”)
14
See id. at 351 (noting rulings on disclosure procedure influenced by arbitrators’ experience
and legal background). On the subject of English- or American-style discovery practices, one civil
law authority stated, “we react to the notion of discovery, be it English, or, worse, American style,
as an invasion of privacy by the court which is only acceptable in criminal cases.” Id.
15
See WHITE & CASE LLP & QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON SCH. OF INT’L ARB., 2018
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7
(2018) [hereinafter White & Case & Queen Mary Univ.] (finding survey respondents most commonly cited cost as main drawback of international arbitration).
16
See discussion infra pp. 62-90 (analyzing question at issue in ZF Automotive).
17
See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery
for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019) (determining text, context, and structure of § 1782(a) clearly indicate “tribunal” includes private international arbitration); Hans Smit,
International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (1965)
(laying out rationale underlying 1964 amendments to § 1782).
18
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004) (outlining factors for district courts to consider in evaluating § 1782 requests).
19
See discussion infra pp. 87-91 (analyzing applicability of Intel factors to private tribunals).
20
See discussion infra pp. 65-79 (analyzing question at issue in ZF Automotive).
21
See In re Application, 939 F.3d at 728–30 (discussing potential implications for FAA and
efficiency of international arbitration).
22
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 268 (Breyer J., dissenting) (reasoning discovery takes time, adds cost,
and may force parties to settle disputes).
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no need to do so since it resolved the issue based on the statute’s language,
legislative history, and comparison with the FAA.23 Even without addressing this policy concern explicitly, however, the decision responds to practitioners’ and parties’ concerns about the rising cost of international arbitration
and will provide a welcome check on the trend toward overly-expansive discovery.24
This Note proceeds in three parts, beginning with a summary of the
growth in international arbitration in recent decades.25 Next, the paper traces
the history of § 1782 as a statute intended to facilitate international judicial
cooperation.26 This section reviews early circuit court decisions rejecting the
idea that district courts could assist with discovery for private international
arbitrations, and the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., which addressed the scope of § 1782 but not
whether it applied to private arbitration.27 The paper then presents the more
recent post-Intel decisions on the statute, including the circuit split leading
to the ZF Automotive decision.28
23
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *6-7 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (analyzing statute’s language, context, and comparison with FAA).
24
See Benjamin M. Daniels and Jenna M. Scoville, Supreme Court Limits Section 1782 Discovery, NAT’L LAW REVIEW, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-limits-section-1782-discovery-international-arbitrations (last visited Jun 21, 2022) (noting “[i]nternational
arbitration just got cheaper for U.S. companies.”). See also Brief of the Int’l Inst. for Conflict
Prevention & Resol. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce
PLC, (No. 20-794), 2021 WL 39559 (U.S.), at *7 (noting average length from filing of § 1782
application until decision was almost seventeen months); RULES ON THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF
PROCEEDINGS IN INT’L ARB. (PRAGUE RULES) (2018) (offering more efficient alternative to IBA
Rules); Fabian Bonke, Do the Prague Rules Provide for an Efficient Resolution of Construction
Arbitration Disputes?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jul. 20, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/07/20/do-the-prague-rules-provide-for-an-efficient-resolution-of-construction-arbitration-disputes/ (discussing Prague Rules as potential solution to discovery-related cost and time concerns).
25
See discussion infra pp. 16-19 (providing overview of recent growth in international arbitration).
26
See Mousa Zalta, Note, Recent Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. S 1782(a) by the Supreme Court
in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: The Effects on Federal District Courts, Domestic
Litigants, and Foreign Tribunals and Litigants, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 413, 413-14 (2005) (noting
original purpose of statute was to strengthen legal and diplomatic relations).
27
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246-47 (2004) (outlining
questions before the Court); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating holding); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) (stating holding).
28
See, e.g., In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding private international arbitration
in China not “foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782); Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v.
FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 73031 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding private arbitration in Dubai “foreign or international tribunal” under §
1782); Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding private arbitration in United Kingdom “foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782); Servotronics, Inc. v.
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II. FACTS
A.

Growth in Private International Commercial Arbitration

The upsurge in global business transactions in recent decades has
brought with it an increase in international disputes between contracting parties.29 Research suggests that, for both legal practitioners and corporate
counsel, private arbitration is the preferred method of resolving transnational
disputes.30 Arbitration is, by definition, a form of dispute resolution based
on a private agreement between contracting parties.31 The parties grant
power to one or more individuals to determine the outcome of a dispute, and
the outcome is then binding on the parties.32 Private international arbitration
is an arbitral proceeding between parties to trans-national commercial transactions.33 One often-cited, decades-old estimate puts the frequency of arbitration clauses in international contracts at ninety percent.34 More recent
scholarship notes a lower prevalence, with arbitration clauses present in only
twenty-five percent of international contracts involving companies with
close ties to the United States.35 Regardless of the exact prevalence of such
clauses, the growth in the volume of international business has certainly
driven growth in the use of private international commercial arbitration.36
Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding same private arbitral body in United
Kingdom not within meaning of § 1782).
29
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 94 (2000) (noting that international commercial arbitration has become “the accepted way of resolving international business disputes.”)
30
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15 at 5 (providing results of survey and
interviews). The survey found that ninety percent of respondents preferred either arbitration alone
or arbitration in combination with other forms of alternative dispute resolution for cross-border
disputes. Id. Survey respondents included more than one thousand private practitioners, full-time
arbitrators, in-house counsel, and others. Id. at 35.
31
See JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1.1 (2nd ed. 2007) (reviewing multiple scholarly definitions of arbitration).
32
See id. (defining arbitration).
33
See Strong, supra note 4, at 300 (distinguishing international commercial arbitration from
investment arbitration).
34
See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (Kluwer
Law and Tax’n Publishers ed., 1993) (citing statistic). The estimate seems to originate in a 1988
book by international arbitration lawyer and scholar Albert Jan Van den Berg. Id.
35
See Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 9, 10 (2019) (presenting empirical analysis of over half a million international contracts between 2000 and 2016). The study found publicly held companies in the United States were more likely to opt for domestic courts than
arbitration. Id.
36
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487, Reporter’s Note 1 (AM.
L. INST. 1987) (“[a]s the volume and extent of international transactions have grown, resort to
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Advantages of Arbitration for International Transactions

Parties choose arbitration over litigation or another form of dispute
resolution in their international contracts for several reasons.37 Many companies and attorneys consider the enforceability of awards to be the primary
advantage of international commercial arbitration.38 Most states enforce international arbitration awards pursuant to the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New
York Convention”).39 Under the New York Convention, states agree to recognize parties’ agreements to arbitrate and to enforce arbitral awards.40 Observers praise the New York Convention for contributing to the growth of
international arbitration because it ensures that states enforce arbitral
awards.41
Parties also opt for private arbitration in international contracts because they can select a neutral venue, avoiding the “hometown justice” that
could result from submitting the dispute to one party’s national courts.42

arbitration as the agreed means of dispute settlement has become widespread.”); Drahozal, supra
note 29, at 94 (noting increased use of international arbitration); White & Case & Queen Mary
Univ., supra note 15, at 5 (finding arbitration preferred method of international dispute resolution).
37
See John R. Trentacosta & Leah R. Imbrogno, Contracting for International Arbitration in
the Global Supply Chain, MICH. B.J., September 2018, at 30-31 (listing considerations parties
should consider when deciding whether to include contractual arbitration clause); White & Case &
Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 5 (finding arbitration frequently pursued in combination with
other forms of alternative dispute resolution).
38
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (setting out survey respondents’
top four advantages of arbitration).
39
See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention] (creating guidelines on recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards between States).
40
See New York Convention, supra note 39, at 38-40 (providing “[e]ach Contracting State
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration
. . . [disputes] between them in respect of a defined legal relationship” and “[e]ach Contracting
State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them . . . .”) Congress implemented
the New York Convention as part of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
41
See von Mehren, supra note 12, at *2 (praising New York Convention for providing “a
simpler and more effective method for obtaining recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards than is typically available for foreign court judgments.”); Gary B. Born, The New York
Convention: A Self-Executing Treaty, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 126 (2018) (“Consistent with the
Convention’s objectives, national courts have held that [its] provisions mandate a uniform, ‘proenforcement’ regime that allows effective, efficient recognition and enforcement of both international arbitration agreements and awards.”)
42
See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 29, at 95 (explaining preference for arbitration); Nyarko,
supra note 35, at 6-7 (attributing preference for arbitration to concerns about home biases and finding that “[i]f the quality of the foreign judicial institutions is not in doubt, parties are much more
likely to refer disputes to the U.S. judiciary than to arbitration.”); von Mehren, supra note 12, at *1
(ascribing preference for arbitration to avoidance of “home court advantage”). Parties may be more

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

International Arbitration

7/11/22 9:23 AM

247

Flexibility is another key advantage, including the parties’ ability to select
the members of the arbitral tribunal, to control the timetable, and to establish
the procedural rules the tribunal will apply.43 Contracting parties also tend
to see arbitration as more confidential than litigation, particularly where a
dispute implicates trade secrets or non-public business practices, since arbitral submissions and proceedings are generally not public.44
C.

The Exchange of Evidence in International Arbitration Proceedings

Most international arbitrations follow a similar overall progression,
with some variation depending on the parties’ preferences and the rules of
the administering institution.45 They take place at a location, or arbitral seat,
agreed-to by the parties and often in a neutral location.46 Although there are
many steps along the way, the process generally involves the following: the
claimant serves a notice of arbitration on the respondent, an arbitral tribunal
is formed, the claimant submits a statement of claim and the respondent submits a statement of defense, the parties exchange evidence, they present arguments at a hearing before the arbitral tribunal, and finally, the tribunal renders a decision and award.47
International arbitrations also involve extensive submissions of documentary evidence; parties support their statements of claim and defense
likely to hold this preference when they have reason to question the independence or reliability of
the other side’s national courts. Von Mehren, supra note 12, at *1.
43
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (finding “flexibility” was third
most valuable characteristic of arbitration); Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 31-32 (observing parties can establish timetable and procedures).
44
See Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 31 (suggesting parties include confidentiality
provisions to avoid information becoming public in potential court proceedings). The lack of standard procedures and the closed nature of international arbitral proceedings has also led some to
question their transparency and ethical grounding. Megan K. Niedermeyer, Ethics for Arbitrators
at the International Level: Who Writes the Rules of the Game?, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 481, 482
(2014) (describing international arbitration as “ethical no-man’s land”).
45
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 13-15 (discussing respondents’
preferred arbitral institutions). The top five institutions in 2018 were the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), and the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). Id.
46
See von Mehren, supra note 12, at *3 (noting concerns regarding designated place of arbitration). London, Paris, Geneva, Zurich, and New York were traditionally the preferred seat for
international arbitration, with Singapore and Hong Kong joining the top five in 2018. See also
White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (listing survey respondents’ preferred
seats).
47
See The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Step by step guide
to arbitration – The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, https://sccinstitute.com/our-services/arbitration/step-by-step-guide-to-arbitration/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2021)
(providing schematic illustration of arbitration process).
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with documentary materials, written witness statements, and expert reports.48
Parties to an arbitration may request documents from the opposing party.49
However, wide-ranging discovery is rare in international arbitration because
mandatory disclosure of evidence is limited to whatever the parties agree in
advance.50 An arbitral tribunal may have discretion to order the parties to
disclose information, but under most arbitral statutes and rules, they may not
order discovery from third parties.51
Although many international arbitration practitioners frown upon
extensive discovery, more expansive evidence-gathering is becoming the
norm.52 The IBA Rules have become the most commonly-adopted rules of
evidence in international arbitration, and even though the rules stop short of
allowing full American-style discovery, practitioners view them as being
more influenced by the common law than the civil law tradition.53 This has
prompted backlash, particularly by civil law practitioners advocating for
more efficient evidentiary procedures.54

48
See IBA Rules, supra note 9, art. 3-6 (outlining model rules for exchange of documents,
witness statements, and expert reports).
49
See id. at art. 3 (detailing model procedure for “Request to Produce”).
50
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting limited
discovery in international arbitration).
Few, if any, non-American tribunals of any kind, including arbitration panels created by private
parties, provide for the kind of discovery that is commonplace in our federal courts and in most, if
not all, state courts. If the parties to a private international arbitration make no provision for some
degree of consensual discovery inter se in their agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators control discovery, and neither party is deprived of its bargained-for efficient process by the other party’s tactical use of discovery devices.
Id.; see also Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 346 (describing “[t]he nature and the extent of disclosure
between the parties will be influenced by the principle of party autonomy: it will be subject to the
agreement the parties have reached and to the arbitrator’s discretion.”)
51
See Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 350 (discussing limits on arbitrators’ power to order discovery). The FAA and the English and Swiss arbitration statutes are notable exceptions, permitting
arbitrators to require third parties to produce evidence. Id.
52
See von Mehren, supra note 12, at *3 (observing “international arbitration is not well suited
to cases that require significant discovery from the other side” and that “if you need extensive
discovery to make your case, you are much better off in a U.S. court.”); see also Weiner, supra
note 9 (discussing arbitral tribunals’ frequent use of IBA rules to guide disclosure).
53
See Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 356 (noting perception of common-law influence in IBA
Rules). The IBA Rules’ commitment to respect of other legal traditions should be “taken with a
grain of salt.” Id.
54
See Prague Rules, supra note 24, Note from the Working Group (advocating greater efficiency through adoption of civil law practices). “One of the ways to increase the efficiency of
arbitral proceedings is to encourage tribunals to take a more active role in managing the proceedings
(as is traditionally done in many civil law countries).” Id.; see also Bonke, supra note 24 (discussing Prague Rules as potential solution to discovery-related cost and time concerns).
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The extent of discovery is also a major driver of the cost of an international arbitration process.55 Although traditionally considered a more efficient alternative to litigation, parties today see high costs as the main drawback of arbitral proceedings.56 High costs typically derive from fees for
arbitrator(s), venues, and translation; others relate more closely to the production of evidence, such as parties and their legal representatives engaging
in “dilatory tactics” and arbitrators being unwilling or unable to impose sanctions.57
With this factual background in mind, the following section traces
the history of § 1782 as a statute intended to assist litigants in “foreign or
international tribunals” in obtaining evidence in the United States.58
III. HISTORY
A.

Section 1782

The legal controversy surrounding § 1782 today focuses on international arbitration, but the statute itself originated in 1855 as Congress’ attempt to allow U.S. courts to provide assistance to foreign litigants.59 After
World War II, commercial transactions between the U.S. and foreign parties
increased significantly.60 At the same time, it became clear that U.S. courts
had a problematic record when it came to international judicial cooperation.61
55

See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (Breyer J., dissenting) (reasoning that discovery takes time, adds cost, and may force parties to settle disputes).
56
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (finding that respondents most
commonly cited cost as main drawback of international arbitration); Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 32 (“Despite popular belief, arbitration is not always cheaper than litigating a case
in the court system. This is especially true in the event of a highly complex, multinational dispute.
In addition to arbitration fees, the parties also may be responsible for Tribunal fees, venue fees,
attorneys’ fees, travel expenses, and translation services, among other things.”)
57
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7-8 (explaining costs and consequences of lack of sanctions); Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 31 (noting flexible procedural rules can lead to squabbling among parties).
58
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (granting district courts discretionary power to order discovery in
foreign proceedings).
59
See The Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855) (tasking circuit courts with
assisting foreign litigants); see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 247 (noting 1855 statute permitted requests
for aid using letters rogatory through diplomatic channels). In a second, revised version of the
statute, Congress placed more limitations on the use of letters rogatory to seek judicial assistance.
The Act of March 3, 1863, § 1, 12 Stat. 769-70 (1863).
60
See Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and A Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 557-58 (1953) (describing history of attitudes toward judicial
cooperation with foreign courts).
61
See id. (noting U.S. took isolationist stance prior to World War II, refusing to enter mutual
judicial assistance treaties). After World War II, “dislocation of persons and property and
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In 1958, Congress appointed the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure (“the Commission”) to “investigate and study present practices in judicial assistance and judicial cooperation between the United States
and Foreign Countries, and to make recommendations for the improvement
of international legal practice and methods of procedure.”62 The Commission recommended that Congress substantially revise § 1782.63 Accordingly,
the 1964 revision of § 1782 provides that “[t]he district court of the district
in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal . . . .”64 The phrase at issue in the recent
circuit split, “foreign or international tribunal,” is not defined in the statute.65
In 1965, the rapporteur of the Commission argued that the revised statute
aimed to improve cooperation between the United States and “tribunals” operating either internationally or in individual countries.66 The term “tribunal,” the rapporteur maintained, encompassed “all bodies that have adjudicatory power, and [wa]s intended to include not only civil, criminal, and
administrative courts . . . but also arbitral tribunals or single arbitrators.”67
Later, the Supreme Court in Intel cited the rapporteur’s article approvingly,
America’s post-war position as the leading industrial and creditor nation of the world combine[d]
to confront the bar with unexpected and sometimes insoluble problems of international practice.”
Id. at 516. The U.S. had some success in seeking judicial cooperation from other common law
countries, but civil law and Islamic law countries routinely rebuffed such requests. Id. at 522.
When other countries sought assistance from the U.S., both executive and judicial branch responses
tended to be delayed and unclear on key procedural points. Id. at 542.
62
See 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3793 (describing purpose of Commission).
63
See id. at 3788 (describing liberalizing purpose of proposed statutory amendments). The
Commission believed the revision “clarifie[d] and liberalize[d] existing U.S. procedures for assisting foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral and documentary evidence in
the United States . . . .” Id.
64
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (granting district courts discretionary power to order discovery for
use in foreign proceedings). The statute goes on to provide that the order may be issued in response
to a letter rogatory, a request from a “foreign or international tribunal,” or an application from any
interested person. Id. The court may appoint a person to gather the requested evidence and may
set the discovery procedures based on either the procedures of the requesting tribunal or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.; see also Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation,
35 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 229 (1994) (describing history of amendments to § 1782). Smit observed
that federal courts were reluctant to follow through on Congress’ shift in policy toward a more
liberal judicial cooperation regime, being already overburdened and reluctant to take on additional
duties. Smit, supra at 229 n.69.
65
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting § 1782
does not define phrase “foreign or international tribunal.”)
66
See Smit, supra note 17, at 1021 (laying out Commission’s rationale underlying proposed
1964 amendments). In a footnote, Smit notes that “[t]he term “tribunal” was chosen deliberately
as being both neutral and encompassing. Any person or body exercising adjudicatory power is
included.” Id. at 1021 n.36.
67
See Smit, supra note 17, at 1021 (presenting Commission’s understanding of what “tribunal” includes).
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for the proposition that “[t]he term ‘tribunal’ . . . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as
well as conventional . . . courts.”68
B.

The Statute’s Applicability to Private Arbitrations: Early Decisions

The issue of whether § 1782 applied to private arbitral proceedings
did not come before federal circuit courts until more than three decades after
the 1964 revisions.69 In 1999, both the Second and Fifth Circuits held that
the statute did not apply to private arbitration.70 Both reasoned that the
phrase “foreign or international tribunal” is ambiguous and that Congress
intended the district courts to assist governmental bodies in obtaining discovery in the United States, not private arbitral panels.71 In addition, in National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (“NBC”), the Second Circuit
compared § 1782 with the district courts’ power to compel discovery in private domestic arbitration under Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”).72 The Second Circuit noted that § 7 of the FAA offers more limited
discovery to parties in domestic arbitrations than § 1782 would grant to

68
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (discussing
meaning of “tribunal”); see also Zalta, supra note 26, at 436 (noting congressional amendments
have continuously liberalized the scope of the statute).
69
See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 191 (holding § 1782 does not apply to arbitral bodies
established by private parties); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International, 168 F.3d 880,
883 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding arbitral bodies established by private parties exempt from § 1782).
70
See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 191 (stating holding); Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883 (stating holding).
71
See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 190 (outlining reasoning); Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883
(outlining reasoning). In NBC, the Second Circuit reasoned that the word “tribunal” is ambiguous
and that nothing in the legislative history or contemporary accounts of the 1964 revision suggested
Congress intended the statute to apply to private arbitration. Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 190. In
Biedermann, the Fifth Circuit similarly grounded its decision on the ambiguity of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal,” and interpreted the legislative history to reveal that “when Congress
in 1964 enacted the modern version of § 1782, it intended to cover governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies.”
Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883.
72
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 1887 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing
more limited discovery for domestic arbitrations under FAA than international arbitrations under §
1782). Section 7 of the FAA governs discovery procedure and is more limited than § 1782 in terms
of who can subpoena or request evidence, which district court can enforce a subpoena or request,
and what kind of evidence can be requested. Id.; see also Ted Folkman, Pre-Hearing Discovery in
Arbitration: Beck’s Superior Revisited, FOLKMAN LLC: LETTERS BLOGATORY (Jan. 19, 2011),
https://lettersblogatory.com/2011/01/19/pre-hearing-discovery-in-arbitration-becks-superior-revisited/ (comparing FAA § 7 with § 1782).
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parties in international arbitration.73 As a result, if § 1782 applied to private
international arbitrations, it would conflict with the FAA.74 The Fifth Circuit
largely shared this view.75 The Fifth Circuit also addressed the effects of a
broad construction of § 1782 on the speed and efficiency of international
arbitration, noting increased discovery would “thwart private international
arbitration’s greatest benefits.”76
C.

The Supreme Court’s Intel Decision

By 2004, § 1782 had created numerous open questions among the
lower courts, some of which the Supreme Court took up in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.77 Here, the Court assessed whether the institution at issue in the case, the European Directorate General–Competition,
was a “tribunal” within the statute’s meaning.78 Intel did not address the
question of whether the statute applies to private arbitration, but the decision
did offer clarity on the meaning of a “tribunal” in “foreign or international
tribunal.”79 The Court concluded that the European Directorate General–
Competition was a tribunal, because Directorate General–Competition acted
as a first-instance decision maker; it had an investigative, evidence-gathering
function, and it issued decisions reviewable by the Court of First Instance
and the European Court of Justice.80 The Court listed several types of proceedings that could fall under the term “tribunal,” including “investigating
magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial
73

See NBC, 165 F.3d at 187 (describing more limited discovery for domestic arbitrations under
FAA than international arbitrations under § 1782); see also Folkman, supra note 72 (comparing
FAA § 7 with § 1782).
74
See NBC, 165 F.3d at 187 (discussing potential conflict with FAA).
75
See Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883 (stating “[i]t is not likely that Congress would have chosen
to authorize federal courts to assure broader discovery in aid of foreign private arbitration than is
afforded its domestic dispute-resolution counterpart.”)
76
Id. (discussing efficiency concerns).
77
542 U.S. 241, 246-47 (2004) (outlining questions before Court). The Court addressed four
main questions in Intel: (1) who qualifies as an “interested person;” (2) does a European administrative agency qualify as a “tribunal;” (3) must a proceeding be pending or imminent; and (4) is
there a “foreign discoverability” requirement, meaning the evidence sought must be discoverable
under the law governing the foreign proceeding. Id. The European Directorate General–Competition is the administrative agency with primary responsibility for enforcing the European Union’s
antitrust laws, including by adjudicating antitrust complaints. Id. at 250.
78
See id. at 258 (holding European Commission, to which Directorate General–Competition
belonged, was first-instance decision maker).
79
See id. at 249 (discussing scope of word “tribunal” in statute).
80
See id. at 257 (noting European regional courts undoubtedly qualify as tribunals); see also
Strong, supra note 4, at 303 (“[T]he Supreme Court interpreted the term ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ in section 1782 as including ‘first-instance decision-makers’ that render ‘dispositive rulings’ that are subject to some form of judicial review.”)
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agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.”81 The Court reasoned that the purpose of the 1964 amendments to § 1782 was to expand procedures for judicial assistance to include
a broader range of decision-making bodies than conventional courts.82
The Intel Court emphasized that district courts’ authority to entertain
discovery requests under § 1782 is entirely discretionary.83 The Court outlined four factors for district courts to consider when deciding whether to
grant a § 1782 discovery request: first, whether the request comes from a
non-participant to a proceeding who otherwise cannot access the information; second, whether the foreign tribunal is receptive to the assistance;
third, whether the request conceals an effort to circumvent evidence-gathering by a foreign tribunal; and fourth, whether the request is unduly intrusive
or burdensome.84
D.

Recent Circuit Court Decisions

The recently-resolved split among circuit courts over the use of §
1782 for private international arbitration stemmed from the Intel decision.85
In multiple cases, parties to private international arbitrations argued they
could seek discovery under § 1782 because the Intel Court reasoned the statute applied to “administrative and arbitral tribunals.”86 In El Paso Corp. v.
81
Id. at 258 (discussing congressional intent in amending statutory language from “court” to
“tribunal”). This aspect of the Court’s reasoning relied in part on the writings of Hans Smit, one
of the rapporteurs of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. Id.
82
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257-58 (2004) (“[W]hen
Congress established the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure in 1958 . . . it
instructed the Rules Commission to recommend procedural revisions ‘for the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies.’”) (quoting § 2, 72 Stat. 1743) (emphasis in
original).
83
See id. at 264 (confirming district courts’ discretion to grant or deny requests). Unrelated
to the meaning of “tribunal,” the Court also held that proceedings before a foreign or international
tribunal did not have to be pending or imminent, and that foreign discoverability was not a § 1782
requirement. Id. at 246-47.
84
See id. at 264-65 (providing four factors to guide district courts). Justice Breyer dissented,
proposing a more limited role for U.S. courts in facilitating foreign discovery requests. Id. at 26869 (Breyer J., dissenting). In Justice Breyer’s view, “discovery and discovery-related judicial proceedings take time, they are expensive, and cost and delay, or threats of cost and delay, can themselves force parties to settle underlying disputes.” Id. Breyer proposed two limitations on § 1782:
(1) if an entity does not view itself as a tribunal, its view should be given great deference; and (2)
foreign discoverability should be required, as should compatibility with the FAA. Id. at 269-70;
see also Zalta, supra note 26, at 442 (noting failure to consider foreign entity’s categorization of
itself could offend courts of other countries).
85
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2020) (seeking to interpret
§ 1782 in line with Intel).
86
See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery
for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Intel determined that § 1782(a)
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La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa (“CEL”), one of the
first post-Intel cases, a Salvadoran utility company argued that the Fifth Circuit should overturn Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l and allow
the company’s § 1782 discovery request.87 The Fifth Circuit declined to do
so.88 The court reasoned that the question of whether a private arbitration is
a “tribunal” was not before the Court in Intel, and that Intel’s only specific
mention of arbitration was in a parenthetical referencing the writings of the
rapporteur of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure.89
Furthermore, Intel did not address the concerns that caused the court in
Biedermann to reject § 1782’s application to private international arbitrations.90 These concerns included the potential for conflict between § 1782
and § 7 of the FAA, the potential for disputes about the domestic or international nature of an arbitration, and the likelihood that allowing parties in international arbitrations to seek discovery in the United States would lead to
delays and drive up the cost of international arbitration.91 In the end, the
Fifth Circuit did not find that Intel required it to overturn Biedermann.92
In 2019, the Sixth Circuit set the stage for the circuit split when it
held, in direct contradiction to the Fifth Circuit, that an arbitration panel in
both Dubai and London was a “foreign or international tribunal.”93 In In re
Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings (“In re Application”), the court conducted a detailed textual analysis of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” and concluded that it could apply to private
arbitration.94 The court also concluded that nothing in Intel limited the
provides for discovery assistance in non-judicial proceedings.”); In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 105 (2d
Cir. 2020), as amended (July 9, 2020) (reasoning Intel did not mandate § 1782 discovery for private
international arbitration).
87
See 341 F. App’x 31, 33 (5th Cir. 2009) (summarizing plaintiff utility company’s argument).
The utility company sought discovery in Texas for use in a Swiss arbitration arising from a dispute
with another utility company. Id. at 32.
88
See id. at 32 (disagreeing that Biedermann was no longer controlling law).
89
See id. at 34 (“The only mention of arbitration in the Intel opinion is in a quote in a parenthetical from a law review article by Hans Smit.”)
90
See id. (noting Intel did not address concerns outlined in Biedermann).
91
See id. (recapping concerns).
92
See CEL, 341 F. App’x at 34 (holding court could not “overrule the decision of a prior panel
unless such overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent . . . .”)
93
See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery
for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019) (announcing holding).
94
See id. at 726 (describing court’s text-based approach to analysis); see also Case Comment,
Statutory Interpretation—Textualism—Sixth Circuit Holds That Private Commercial Arbitration Is
A Foreign or International Tribunal.—In Re: Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings, 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 2627, 2629-33 (2020) (discussing
usage of expressions “international tribunal” and “foreign tribunal” in legal writing). This comment argues that the Sixth Circuit was wrong to analyze “tribunal” alone instead of the full phrase
“foreign or international tribunal.” Harvard Law Review, supra at 2634.
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statute’s applicability to private arbitration.95 Rather, Intel laid out four factors that district courts should consider when deciding whether to grant a §
1782 request, obviating the need for an initial assessment of the type of foreign proceeding.96
Yet other circuits continued to uphold the traditional view that §
1782 permitted discovery only to governmental bodies.97 In the early part of
2020, the Second Circuit again held that private arbitral proceedings are not
within the statute’s scope, this time determining that a Chinese arbitral body
was excluded.98 Like the Fifth Circuit’s 2009 decision in CEL, the Court
reasoned that nothing in Intel overruled its prior decision in NBC.99 Therefore, NBC’s holding that § 1782 did not apply to private arbitration was still
good law.100
E.

The Servotronics Decisions

Also during 2020, two circuit courts reached opposing decisions on
§ 1782 in cases arising from the same facts, beginning with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. (“Servotronics I”).101 The
cases arose from an engine fire caused by a valve malfunction during testing
of a new aircraft, leading to a dispute between Servotronics, the maker of the
valve; Rolls Royce, the maker of the engine; and Boeing, the maker of the
plane.102 In Servotronics I, the Fourth Circuit held that a private arbitral
panel in the United Kingdom was a “foreign or international tribunal” and
could obtain discovery under § 1782.103 The court reasoned that although

95

See In re Application, 939 F.3d at 723 (determining Intel decision does not contradict conclusion of textual analysis).
96
Id. at 726 (outlining reasoning).
97
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 692-94 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding
§ 1782 inapplicable to United Kingdom arbitral panel); Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d
96 (2d Cir. 2020), aff’g by an equally divided court In re Hanwei Guo 2019 WL 917076 (2019)
(refusing to allow discovery under statute for use in private arbitration in China).
98
See Guo, 965 F.3d at 109 (stating holding). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
its longstanding rule that “a three-judge panel is bound by a prior panel’s decision until it is overruled either by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 105.
99
Id. at 105 (stating Intel did not cast doubt on reasoning or holding of NBC).
100
Id. (stating holding). The court reasoned that the Chinese arbitration was a private proceeding because the arbitral institution operated largely independently of the Chinese state, with its
jurisdiction arising solely from the parties’ contractual undertakings. Id. at 108.
101
See 954 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2020) (stating holding); Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce
PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021) (same).
102
See Servotronics, 954 F.3d at 210 (describing facts of case). Servotronics sought to use §
1782 to depose three Boeing employees in support of its defense that the valve did not cause the
fire. Id.
103
See id. (stating holding).
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arbitration is a private process, it occurs under state authority and with judicial oversight.104 With the enactment of the FAA, Congress elevated arbitration as a favored alternative to litigation.105 And since the United Kingdom’s arbitration statute similarly ensured court oversight of arbitrations, the
court held that the London-based arbitral panel at issue was a tribunal for §
1782 purposes.106
Later the same year, the Seventh Circuit held in Servotronics, Inc. v.
Rolls-Royce PLC (“Servotronics II”) that § 1782 does not apply to private
arbitration because, in the overall context of the statute, the phrase “foreign
tribunal” means “a governmental, administrative, or quasi-governmental tribunal.”107 According to the Seventh Circuit, even if interpreted in light of
the liberalizing trend observed in Intel, the language of § 1782 does not suggest Congress intended to cover private arbitral tribunals.108 Here, too, the
court expressed concern that a broad reading of § 1782 would directly conflict with the FAA, where discovery is more limited.109 Servotronics, the
party seeking discovery under § 1782 in both cases, successfully petitioned
for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in March 2021.110 The U.K.-

104

See id. at 214 (“[C]ontrary to Boeing’s general assertion that arbitration is not a product of
‘government-conferred authority,’ under U.S. law, it clearly is.”) The court relied on Intel’s interpretation of congressional intent at the time of the 1964 amendments to § 1782, as aiming to authorize U.S. assistance to “administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad.” Id.
105
See id. (reasoning United Kingdom arbitral panel was “acting with the authority of the
State” even under narrower reading of § 1782); see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Note, If It Looks Like
A Duck . . . : Private International Arbitral Bodies Are Adjudicatory Tribunals Under 28 U.S.C. §
1782(a), 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1659, 1708 (2010) (arguing Congress intended to expand § 1782
with 1964 amendments). Hasbrouck argues that when courts refuse to apply the statute to arbitral
proceedings, they allow policy concerns to act as the dispositive factor. Hasbrouck, supra at 1708;
see also Charles E. Sheehan, Case Comment, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Eleventh Circuit
Holds Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is a “Tribunal” for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 –
Consorcio Ecuatoriano De Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. Jas Forwarding (USA), Inc., 685 F. 3d 987
(11th Cir. 2012), 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 489, 497 (2013) (arguing broader reading of §
1782 is preferable).
106
See Servotronics, 954 F.3d at 213 (reasoning arbitral panel acted with state oversight).
107
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020) (stating holding); see also Jenna M. Godfrey, Comment, Americanization of Discovery: Why Statutory Interpretation Bars 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)’s Application in Private International Arbitration Proceedings,
60 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 518 (2010) (concluding plain language, legislative history, and statutory
scheme all exclude private international arbitration). Further, placing private arbitration within the
statute’s scope would defeat its purpose as a lower-cost, quicker, and more confidential alternative
to litigation. Godfrey, supra at 518.
108
See Servotronics, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (outlining court’s reasoning).
109
See id. (describing clash with FAA).
110
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (Mem.), aff’d, 979 F.3d 689
(U.S. Mar. 22, 2021) (granting certiorari).

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

7/11/22 9:23 AM

International Arbitration

257

based arbitral panel went ahead with its hearing as planned in May 2021, and
not long afterward, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot.111
F.

The ZF Automotive Decision

In December 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two consolidated § 1782 cases: AlixPartners, LLP v. The Fund for Protection of
Investors’ Rights in Foreign States (“AlixPartners”) and ZF Automotive US,
Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. (“ZF Automotive”).112 AlixPartners is an appeal from
a Second Circuit ruling that addressed whether § 1782 permits discovery assistance to a party in investor-state arbitration.113 There, a Russian corporation, the Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States (“the
Fund”), sought discovery assistance for use in proceedings before an arbitral
panel established under the bilateral investment treaty between Lithuania and
Russia.114 The court declined to extend its holding in NBC to this type of
panel, holding instead that the panel was a “foreign or international tribunal.”115 Even though the panel in AlixPartners had some characteristics of
private commercial arbitration, it was established by an investor and a foreign state pursuant to a treaty between two States.116 Therefore, it fits the
Second Circuit’s requirement that § 1782 assistance go only to governmental
111
See Ted Folkman, Anticlimax of the Day: Servotronics Case Settles, FOLKMAN LLC: THE
LETTERS BLOGATORY (Sep. 9, 2021), https://folkman.law/2021/09/09/anticlimax-of-the-day-servotronics-case-settles/ (reporting on status of case); see also Alison Frankel, DOJ will argue at
SCOTUS against U.S. discovery in private foreign arbitration, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/doj-will-argue-scotus-against-us-discovery-privateforeign-arbitration-2021-08-03/ (describing timeline of underlying arbitration).
112
See AlixPartners, LLP v. Fund for Prot. of Investors’ Rts. in Foreign States, 142 S. Ct. 638
(Mem) (2021) (consolidating cases and granting certiorari); ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.,
No. 21-401, 2021 WL 5858630 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2021) (same); Timothy Blakely et al., International
Arbitration Update: Supreme Court Takes Opportunity to Revisit Circuit Split over Discovery in
Aid of International Arbitration, JD SUPRA (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/scotus-to-resolve-circuit-split-after-7429313/ (last visited Jan 9, 2022) (discussing case consolidation and scheduling).
113
See Fund for Prot. of Inv. Rts. in Foreign States Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Ord.
Granting Leave to Obtain Discovery for use in Foreign Proc., 5 F.4d 216, at 220 (presenting questions for consideration).
114
See id. at 221-22 (describing factual background).
115
See id. at 233 (stating holding).
116
See id. at 225-26 (reiterating factors laid out in Guo to consider nature of arbitral body).
The Second Circuit summarized four factors it identified in Guo:

(1) the ‘degree of state affiliation and functional independence possessed by the entity’;
(2) the ‘degree to which a state possesses the authority to intervene to alter the outcome
of an arbitration after the panel has rendered a decision’; (3) the ‘nature of the jurisdiction
possessed by the panel’; and (4) the ‘ability of the parties to select their own arbitrators.’
Id.
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tribunals.117 Earlier, in Servotronics II, a Department of Justice amicus brief
had expressed concerns about applying § 1782 to investor-state arbitrations
because U.S. assistance could destabilize or politicize those processes.118
The government argued Congress could not possibly have intended the statute to apply to investor-state arbitration when such dispute settlement did not
exist in 1964.119 Moreover, allowing broad discovery would “upset settled
expectations” of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and the traditional rules of
evidence in investor-state dispute settlement.120
In ZF Automotive, a Hong Kong-based electronics manufacturer,
Luxshare, began arbitration in Germany against ZF, a Michigan-based automotive parts manufacturer.121 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan granted Luxshare’s request for discovery from ZF and two of its
senior officers.122 ZF argued the district court should stay discovery until the
Supreme Court decided Servotronics, since that decision would control the
outcome of ZF’s case.123 The court disagreed, because “the current law in
the Sixth Circuit [was] that § 1782 discovery may be used for private commercial arbitrations.”124 ZF petitioned for certiorari even before the Sixth
117

See id. (stating holding).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 32, Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021) (Mem.) (No. 975 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2020)
(No. 20-794) 2021 WL 2714670 (stating “the first international agreements containing provisions
for investor-state arbitration were not adopted until several years later.”); see also Frankel, supra
note 111 (describing Department of Justice policy concerns).
119
See Brief for the United States, supra note 118, at 32 (arguing “investor-state arbitration is
not properly understood as a ‘proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal’”).
120
See id. (outlining concerns about impact on investor-state arbitration).
118

[I]njecting broad discovery, aided by the assistance of U.S. courts, into streamlined investor-state arbitrations could undermine the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of those
mechanisms. Doing so could upset settled expectations of investors and foreign states
that select a particular arbitral regime, including rules applying to discovery, by allowing
one party, or potentially both, to circumvent those settled rules. And to the extent that
the availability of broad, court-aided discovery would dissuade investors and foreign
states from selecting that model, it could hinder certain benefits that stem from the availability of investor-state arbitration.
Id.
121
See Matthew Adler et al., SCOTUS to Resolve Circuit Split After All—Can Federal Courts
Order Discovery for Use in Private, Commercial International Arbitrations?, JD SUPRA (Dec. 21,
2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/scotus-to-resolve-circuit-split-after-7429313/ (outlining background and significance of ZF Automotive within context of circuit split).
122
See Luxshare, LTD. v. ZF Auto. US, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d 510, 513 (E.D. Mich.), cert.
granted before judgment, 142 S. Ct. 637 (2021), and rev’d, No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355 (U.S.
June 13, 2022) (denying ZF’s motion to stay and granting Luxshare’s motion to compel discovery).
123
See id. at *2 (summarizing ZF’s argument that it would likely succeed on merits of appeal).
124
See id. (citing Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting grant of certiorari
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Circuit ruled on its appeal, pitching its case as the ideal vehicle for the Court
to finally resolve the § 1782 question given the withdrawal of the Servotronics case.125
IV. ANALYSIS
In ZF Automative, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the interpretation of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” in § 1782 as encompassing private international arbitral proceedings.126 The Court reached this conclusion based on the plain language of the phrase and its context within the
overall statute, reasoning that the background, congressional intent, and legislative history also supported its conclusion.127 The Court compared § 1782
to the FAA as part of its discussion of congressional intent, but did not address other policy concerns, notably the implications of the decision for the
efficiency of international arbitrations.128 This Note’s analysis therefore
considers two main questions.129 First, is the Court’s interpretation of the
phrase “foreign or international tribunal” supported by the plain meaning,
statutory context, and legislative history?130 And second, what policy implications follow from the ruling, particularly for the efficiency of international
arbitration?131
A.

The Ordinary Meaning, Statutory Context, and Legislative History of

does not itself change binding precedent). ZF appealed to the Sixth Circuit but to no avail; the
Sixth Circuit agreed ZF could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits based only on a
grant of certiorari, and in any event, the Supreme Court had by then dismissed the Servotronics
case. See Luxshare, Ltd. v. ZF Auto. US, Inc., 15 F.4th 780, 783 (6th Cir. 2021).
125
See Petition for A Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 5, ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare,
Ltd., 142 S. Ct. 637 (2021) (Mem.) (No. 21-401) 2021 WL 4173622 (noting “if Servotronics is
dismissed, the existing circuit-split and the disuniformity and uncertainty it engenders-will persist.”)
126
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *3 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (stating holding).
127
See id. at 5-8 (analyzing text of statute, statutory context, and legislative history).
128
See id. at 7 (comparing § 1782 to FAA). Contra Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65 (addressing
policy implications by outlining § 1782 factors for district courts to consider).
129
See discussion infra pp. 69-92 (discussing three main questions for interpretation of §
1782).
130
See discussion infra pp. 69-82 (discussing legislative history).
131
See discussion infra pp. 82-92 (discussing policy concerns).
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“Foreign or International Tribunal”

The meaning of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” in §
1782 was the sole issue before the Court in ZF Automative.132 The full provision reads “[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal . . . .”133 The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits considered the
phrase “foreign or international tribunal” could either include or exclude private arbitrations, and was therefore ambiguous.134 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that other courts and jurists regularly used the word “tribunal” to refer to private commercial arbitral panels. 135 Moreover, the court
reasoned that where the word was used elsewhere in the statute, its meaning
did not preclude its application to an arbitral proceeding.136 The Supreme
Court in ZF Automative also found ambiguity in the word “tribunal” standing
alone.137 The Court therefore focused on the use of the word within a phrase,
reasoning that both “foreign tribunal” and “international tribunal” are
phrases that connote sovereign authority.138 The Court noted that the later
provisions § 1782 support this reading by giving the district courts the option
132

See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *3 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (stating question at issue).
133
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (granting district courts discretionary power to order discovery for
use in foreign proceedings).
134
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 2020), cert.
granted, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021) (“In both common and legal parlance, the phrase ‘foreign or international tribunal’ can be understood to mean only state-sponsored tribunals [or] . . . to include private arbitration panels. Both interpretations are plausible.”); see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In our view, the term ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ is sufficiently ambiguous that it does not necessarily include or exclude the arbitral panel
at issue here.”); Rep. of Kazakhstan v Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1999) (following Second Circuit’s observation that “foreign or international tribunal” meaning was ambiguous).
135
See In re Application, 939 F.3d at 723 (“[T]he text, context, and structure of § 1782(a)
provide no reason to doubt that the word “tribunal” includes private commercial arbitral panels . . .
.”) The court also provided examples of court decisions and jurists using “tribunal” to describe
arbitration. Id. at 720-21.
136
See id. at 722-23 (analyzing meaning of “tribunal” throughout § 1782). The Sixth Circuit
identified the primary feature of a “tribunal” based on the statute to be evidence-gathering, not
being a government body. Id. Commentary on In re Application argues the Sixth Circuit was
wrong to direct its analysis only to the word “tribunal,” because the phrases “international tribunal”
or “foreign tribunal” are much more likely to refer to a governmental body. See Harvard Law
Review, supra note 94, at 2634 (analyzing use of phrases).
137
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *5 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (reasoning “tribunal” standing alone “shed little light” and did not exclude private adjudicatory bodies).
138
See ZF Auto., 2022 WL 2111355, at *6 (observing that phrase “foreign leader” brings to
mind “an official of a foreign state, not a team captain of a European football club.”)
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to adopt the procedures of “the foreign country or the international tribunal”
when ordering discovery under the statute.139
The Court then addressed the legislative history and purpose of the
statute.140 Here, the Court reasoned that with the 1964 amendments to §
1782, Congress intended to expand the range of foreign and international
bodies U.S. courts could assist, but did not intend to expand assistance to
private bodies.141 Congress’ intent in appointing the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure was to improve cooperation between
the U.S. and foreign countries.142
This reading departs from some previous interpretations of the Congressional intent behind the revision of § 1782 in 1964.143 There is broad
agreement that the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure
aimed to liberalize procedures for international judicial cooperation.144 In
Intel, the Court reasoned that Congress amended § 1782 in 1964 as a means
to improve procedures for judicial assistance, which included “administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad.”145 In describing quasi-judicial
proceedings, the Court mentioned “arbitral tribunals” as an example.146 The
Rapporteur of the Commission, whose writings the Intel Court cited, believed a “tribunal” included “arbitral tribunals or single arbitrators.”147 The
ZF Automative decision clarifies that any such “quasi-judicial agencies” or
139

See id. (discussing congruity of holding with other statutory provisions).
See id. at *7 (analyzing statute’s history and purpose).
141
See id. (“From the start, the statute has been about respecting foreign nations and the governmental and intergovernmental bodies they create.”) The Court also noted the statute’s primary
purpose is to foster comity and encourage reciprocal assistance with foreign governments. See id.
142
See id. (describing Commission’s mandate)
143
See In re Application, 939 F.3d at 723 (“[T]he text, context, and structure of § 1782(a)
provide no reason to doubt that the word ‘tribunal’ includes private commercial arbitral panels . . .
.”) Contra Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[L]egislative
history reveals that when Congress in 1964 enacted the modern version of § 1782, it intended to
cover governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other statesponsored adjudicatory bodies.”); Harvard Law Review, supra note 94, at 2634 (arguing “foreign
tribunal” or “international tribunal” usage meant sovereign bodies when amendment passed).
144
See S. REP. Act of Sept. 15, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-1580, at 3793 (1964), as reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3793 (describing commission’s purpose to “investigate and study present
practices in judicial assistance and judicial cooperation between the United States and Foreign
Countries, and to make recommendations for the improvement of international legal practice and
methods of procedure”); see also Jones, supra note 60, at 516, 522, 557-58 (describing U.S. judicial
assistance regime problems before1964 amendment to § 1782); Smit, supra note 64, at 229 (discussing amendment’s shift toward more liberal judicial cooperation regime).
145
See id. at 258 (discussing congressional intent in amending statutory language from “court”
to “tribunal”).
146
See id. (quoting Smit, supra note 17, at 1026–27 nn.71, 73) (explaining body Commission
believed “tribunal” included).
147
See Smit, supra note 17, at 1021 (presenting Commission’s understanding of what “tribunal” includes).
140
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“arbitral tribunals” must be governmental in nature, and does not include
privately-constituted panels.148
This reading makes sense in light of the history of private, international, commercial arbitration, which essentially did not exist at the time of
the 1964 amendments to § 1782.149 It is therefore probable that Congress
simply did not have a specific intent regarding application of the statute to
private arbitration.150 Although international commerce certainly expanded
during the post-World War II period, growth in cross-border trade and investment in recent decades far outstrips any previous era.151 As noted, Intel
mentions “arbitral tribunals” only once as an example of the kinds of nonconventional courts the Commission believed could potentially fall within
the amended statute.152 While the interpretation of a statute can evolve over
time to meet changes in society, it seems unlikely that Congress considered
permitting parties of private arbitrations to seek discovery under § 1782.153
The Court in ZF Automative also firmly rejected Luxshare’s argument that private arbitral tribunals are governmental because national courts
play a role in enforcing their decisions.154 The Fourth Circuit had relied on
this reasoning in the first Servotronics decision, where it concluded that the
extent of judicial oversight provided in both the FAA and in the United Kingdom’s arbitration statute was sufficient to put private arbitrations under the
aegis of state authority.155 According to ZF Automative, this view of arbitration improperly “erase[s] any distinction between private and governmental

148
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257-58 (2004) (noting
Congress amended § 1782 to improve assistance to quasi-judicial agencies as well as courts).
149
See Harvard Law Review, supra note 94, at 2634 (noting private commercial arbitration
uncommon during § 1782’s enactment).
150
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020) cert. granted,
141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021) (“Servotronics relies heavily on the professor’s inclusion of ‘arbitral tribunals’ in this footnoted list, but this reliance is misplaced. The quotation from the professor’s article
appears in the Court’s opinion as part of an explanatory parenthetical. There is no indication that
the phrase ‘arbitral tribunals’ includes private arbitral tribunals.”)
151
See Nyarko, supra note 35, at 7 (discussing recent growth in movement of goods and services internationally); see also Drahozal, supra note 29, at 94 (discussing recent increase in international commercial transactions and preference for arbitration).
152
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 259 (quoting writings of rapporteur of Commission);
153
See Harvard Law Review, supra note 94, at 2634 (“[T]he word [tribunal] seems to carry a
narrower meaning in the statute that would probably not embrace private commercial arbitration,
even if that type of dispute resolution were as important at the time of enactment as it is now.”)
154
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *8 (U.S. June
13, 2022) (dismissing argument as “implausibly broad definition of a governmental adjudicative
body”).
155
See id. at 214 (“[C]ontrary to Boeing’s general assertion that arbitration is not a product of
‘government-conferred authority,’ under U.S. law, it clearly is.”)
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adjudicative bodies.”156 In Intel, the Supreme Court took a functional approach in assessing whether the European Directorate-General Competition
was a “foreign or international tribunal,” raising the issue of whether a similarly functional appraisal of private arbitrations would put them inside or
outside the statute’s scope.157 The characteristics the Court found persuasive
were the European Directorate-General Competition’s status as a first-instance decision-maker, its evidence-gathering function, and the European
courts’ role in reviewing its decisions.158 Arbitral tribunals are decisionmakers because they determine the outcome of disputes in a manner that is
binding on the parties.159 They gather evidence through document exchange
between the parties, in accordance with their prior agreements.160 In the
United States, arbitral decisions are also subject to limited judicial review
whereby federal courts can confirm awards or vacate them if they were
reached through corruption, fraud, misconduct, or the arbitrators’ bias.161
Parties to private arbitrations therefore have no opportunity for appellate review of the merits of their case, only the existence of misconduct.162 The
holding in ZF Automotive, that arbitral tribunals do not possess state

156
See ZF Automotive, 2022 WL 2111355, at *8 (distinguishing private arbitrations from governmental adjudicative bodies).
157
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 257-58 (2004) (noting DG-Competition characteristics); see also
Strong, supra note 4, at 303 (“In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court interpreted the term
‘foreign or international tribunal’ in section 1782 as including ‘first-instance decision-makers’ that
render ‘dispositive rulings’ that are subject to some form of judicial review.”)
158
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258 (explaining how “tribunal” fit within statute); see also Abdul
Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 725 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting Supreme Court’s assessment “primarily focused
on the decision-making power of the Commission . . . .”)
159
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (declaring arbitration contracts to be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable”).
160
See IBA Rules, supra note 9, art. 3-6 (providing detailed model rules for exchange of documents, witness statements, and expert reports); see also Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 346 (“The
nature and the extent of disclosure between the parties will be influenced by the principle of party
autonomy: it will be subject to the agreement the parties have reached and to the arbitrator’s discretion.”)
161
See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (granting federal courts jurisdiction to confirm or vacate awards).
162
See In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2020), as amended (July 9, 2020) (“[T]he limited
review provided to parties to CIETAC arbitrations in Chinese courts and the role of the Chinese
government in enforcing awards are not enough to render CIETAC a ‘foreign or international tribunal.’”) The grounds for setting aside an arbitration award under Chinese law were just as limited
as the grounds in U.S. courts: lack of agreement to arbitrate, improper appointment of arbitrators,
or corruption. Id.; see also Strong, supra note 4, at 303 (“[T]he Directorate-General was in this
instance acting as what was effectively the taker of proof for the Court of First Instance and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).”)
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authority simply because their decisions receive some court oversight, aligns
with Intel, where judicial review of decisions was one key trait of a “tribunal.”163
B.

Conflict with the FAA

The Court in ZF Automative further reasoned that “[e]xtending §
1782 to include private bodies would also be in significant tension with the
FAA . . . because § 1782 permits much broader discovery than the FAA allows.”164 Under the FAA, only arbitrators, not parties, can subpoena evidence; only the district court where the arbitration is seated can enforce the
subpoena; and only mandatorily-produced evidence may be brought before
the arbitrator, not other forms of pre-hearing discovery.165 In contrast, §
1782 permits parties and other interested persons to file a request, and permits them to seek discovery in any district where a person or item is located.166 The Fourth Circuit reconciled these concerns in Servotronics I by
noting that § 1782 is designed to assist foreign tribunals in accessing information located in the United States, therefore its purpose is entirely different
from that of the FAA.167 This reasoning means that instead of clashing with
the FAA, applying § 1782 to private international arbitration creates a level
playing field with domestic arbitration in terms of the ability to obtain discovery through the courts.168 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged, however,
that § 1782 would still allow a foreign arbitral panel to have broader geographical scope than an American panel.169 The court’s only rationale for
this discrepancy was that it was the inevitable result of Congress’ public

163
See ZF Automotive, 2022 WL 2111355, at *7 (discussing need to avoid mismatch between
domestic and international arbitration).
164
See ZF Automotive, 2022 WL 2111355, at *7 (dismissing argument that private arbitrations
are governmental because courts enforce their decisions); Intel, 542 U.S. at 257-58 (2004) (noting
availability of judicial review as key feature of “tribunal”).
165
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing
more limited discovery for domestic arbitrations under FAA than international arbitrations under §
1782); see also Folkman, supra note 72 (comparing FAA § 7 with § 1782).
166
See NBC, 165 F.3d at 187; Folkman, supra note 72 (comparing FAA § 7 with § 1782).
167
See Servotronics, 954 F.3d at 215-16 (reasoning that under § 1782 district court effectively
functions as “a surrogate for a foreign tribunal by taking testimony and statements for use in the
foreign proceeding”).
168
See id. (“When viewed in this light, the district court functions no differently than does the
foreign arbitral panel or, indeed, an American arbitral panel.”)
169
See id. (“If such a geographical extension were inappropriate, then Congress would not
have enacted § 1782 at all. But it did—and for good reason—and the parties are bound by it. Moreover, any undue burdens that might result in this regard can and should be managed by the district
court with the discretion conferred on it by § 1782(a).”)
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policy decision, an interpretation the Supreme Court declined to follow in
ZF Automative.170
C.

Efficiency Implications

Perhaps the most commonly-advanced policy argument against
broadening § 1782 to encompass private international arbitration was that
allowing discovery in the United States would add undue costs and lengthen
the time required for private arbitration.171 This argument is often expressed
in terms of international arbitration being a more efficient option than crossborder litigation.172 The Department of Justice has argued that allowing parties to investor-state arbitrations to use § 1782 would “undermine the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of those mechanisms” and “could upset settled
expectations of investors and foreign states that select a particular arbitral
regime[.]”173 Practitioners similarly cite high costs as the biggest drawback
of international arbitration.174 Some of those high costs relate to the gathering and exchange of evidence, which can be extensive even without access
170
See ZF Automotive, 2022 WL 2111355, at *7 (following Seventh Circuit in observing that
“[i]t’s hard to conjure a rationale for giving parties to private foreign arbitrations such broad access
to federal-court discovery assistance in the United States while precluding such discovery assistance for litigants in domestic arbitrations.”) (quoting Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975
F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1684 (2021)).
171
See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268 (2004) (Breyer
J., dissenting) (opining that expansive discovery would contradict core purpose of arbitration as
efficient alternative to litigation); see also Servotronics, 954 F.3d at 214 (summarizing efficiency
concerns).

Boeing advances a parade of horribles that it asserts would follow from applying §
1782(a) to arbitration proceedings . . . [arguing that] application of § 1782(a) would
broaden the procedural scope of arbitration and make available in foreign arbitrations
the full discovery process available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
would, Boeing contends, inject extraordinary delay and costs into arbitrations, thereby
defeating their purpose and undermining parties’ bargained-for method of dispute resolution.
Id.; Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use
in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 730 (6th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that authorizing discovery
would defeat main purpose of arbitration as efficient alternative).
172
See In re Application, 939 F.3d at 730 (citing efficiency as main purpose of arbitration).
173
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32, ZF Automative U.S., Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 2022 WL 333383 (U.S.) (arguing broader discovery could destabilize investor-state arbitration regime); Brief for the United States, supra note 118, at 32 (same).
174
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (finding that respondents most
commonly cited cost as main drawback of international arbitration); Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 32 (“Despite popular belief, arbitration is not always cheaper than litigating a case
in the court system. This is especially true in the event of a highly complex, multinational dispute.”); von Mehren, supra note 12, at *2 (describing cost-effectiveness and potential short timeline
for arbitration).
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to discovery in the United States.175 Other costs are driven by parties and
their legal representatives engaging in “dilatory tactics,” and arbitrators being unwilling or unable to impose sanctions which might prevent delays.176
Seeking discovery in the United States under § 1782 also requires sufficient
time for the party’s application to make its way through the docket of the
relevant district court.177 This risks adding to the cost of already-costly proceedings.178 Therefore, although the Court did not address efficiency concerns in ZF Automotive, the decision will allay concerns about allowing
American-style discovery into international arbitration, where it has never
been part of the traditional practice.179 This is particularly true of cases
where expansive discovery was not part of the parties’ prior agreements.180
Yet while the ZF Automotive decision will promote efficiency, it was
arguably not the only way to do so.181 The Court in Intel addressed efficiency
concerns by emphasizing that § 1782 grants the district courts discretion to
decide whether to grant a discovery request and by providing factors to guide
those decisions.182 The four factors outlined in Intel were: whether the requestor cannot otherwise access the information; whether the nature and
character of the foreign tribunal makes it receptive to the assistance; whether
the request conceals an effort to circumvent the tribunal’s own evidence-

175
See IBA Rules, supra note 9, art. 3-6 (outlining detailed rules for exchange of documents,
witness statements, and expert reports).
176
See White & Case & Queen Mary Univ., supra note 15, at 7 (explaining costs and consequences of lack of sanctions); Trentacosta & Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 31 (noting flexibility can
cause squabbling among parties).
177
See Folkman, supra note 72 (discussing potential mootness if arbitration outpaced § 1782
application decision).
178
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268-69 (2004) (Breyer, J.
dissenting) (arguing proliferation of discovery into international arbitration defeats judicial cooperation goals of § 1782).

To the extent that expensive, time-consuming battles about discovery proliferate, they
deflect the attention of foreign authorities from other matters those authorities consider
more important; they can lead to results contrary to those that foreign authorities desire;
and they can promote disharmony among national and international authorities, rather
than the harmony that § 1782 seeks to achieve. They also use up domestic judicial resources and crowd our dockets.
Id.
179

See Prague Rules, supra note 24 (advocating greater efficiency through adoption of civil
law practices); Bonke, supra note 24 (discussing Prague Rules as potential solution to discoveryrelated cost and time concerns).
180
See Vercauteren, supra note 10, at 346 (describing how principle of party autonomy limits
discovery in arbitration to only disclosures parties agree to).
181
See discussion infra pp. 87-90.
182
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 265 (outlining four factors for district court consideration when deciding § 1782 applications).
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gathering; and whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.183 The
Court in ZF Automotive could have authorized the district courts to apply
these factors to private arbitrations, potentially giving some factors more
weight.184 For example, the district courts could have simply refused requests if the “nature” of the foreign tribunal was a private arbitral panel, particularly where the parties had not agreed among themselves to use § 1782
requests, or if the arbitrators themselves opposed the discovery request.185
The district court could also give additional weight to the “unduly intrusive
or burdensome” factor if the request caused unreasonable delays and costs.186
As the Fourth Circuit also noted, the process envisaged in § 1782 does not
grant parties the full scope of discovery open to litigants under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.187 The process sees the district court serving a
limiting role in procuring certain evidence that the party specifies, not granting the party themselves the ability to seek unlimited discovery.188 Seen in
this light, the Intel decision already gave the district courts an analytical
framework to accept or reject § 1782 requests for use in private international
arbitrations.189 By finding that the statute’s language and purpose simply do
not encompass private arbitration, the ZF Automative decision relieves them
of the need to conduct this assessment in the first place.190
D.

Remaining Questions

ZF Automative provided a clear answer to the question driving the §
1782 circuit split, and impliedly addressed practitioners’ concerns about the
expansion of discovery in international arbitration.191 It leaves some § 1782
questions unresolved, however, and raises new ones.192 Perhaps most obviously, the decision will hinder parties’ ability to obtain evidence that

183

See id. at 265 (providing four factors to guide district courts).
See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (In re Application to Obtain Discovery
for Use in Foreign Proc.), 939 F.3d 710, 730 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing potential use of factors to
counteract efficiency concerns).
185
See id. (discussing application of factors).
186
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 268-69 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (expressing concern about potential
“fishing expeditions” by private arbitration parties).
187
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (addressing efficiency concerns).
188
See id. (addressing limited role of district courts).
189
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 265 (outlining four factors for district court consideration when deciding § 1782 applications).
190
See discussion supra pp. 64-77 (presenting Court’s conclusion based on statutory language
and purpose).
191
See Daniels and Scoville, supra note 24 (discussing impact of decision).
192
See Daniels and Scoville, supra note 24 (outlining questions arising from decision).
184
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supports their claims or defenses but happens to be located in the United
States.193 Parties may still request evidence from other parties, and they can
empower arbitrators to compel disclosure.194 But because of the geographic
limitations of the FAA, they cannot ask a United States court to enforce a
subpoena if they are seated outside the United States.195 The decision might
also cause even more litigation to clarify whether a particular arbitral tribunal
has sufficient governmental authority.196 The Court itself recognized that it
left open the possibility that an investor-state arbitral tribunal might, in different circumstances, exercise governmental authority.197 Although one
party to the dispute in Alix Partners was the state of Lithuania, the arbitration
itself was an ad hoc panel constituted solely for that dispute.198 Investorstate arbitrations that take place at permanent institutions or courts potentially have sufficient governmental authority, but this will only be decided in
future cases.199
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to the ZF Automotive decision, most courts held that the plain
meaning of the word “tribunal” in 28 U.S.C. § 1782 was ambiguous: it could
plausibly either include or exclude private international arbitration. Legislative history, contemporary writings, and the Intel decision also suggested
that Congress intended to liberalize the statute, including applying it to a
193

See Luxshare, LTD. v. ZF Auto. US, Inc., No. 20-MC-51245, 2021 WL 3629899, at *5
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 637 (2021) (No. 21-401) (reasoning § 1782
discovery serves public interest by supporting truth in foreign proceedings); Daniels and Scoville,
supra note 24 (noting parties have less ability to obtain information outside arbitration rules or
applicable laws).
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See Vercauteren, supra note 10 at 346 (2012) (noting parties’ disclosure agreements and
arbitrators’ powers).
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See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing
more limited discovery for domestic arbitrations under FAA than international arbitrations under §
1782); see also discussion, supra p. 78 (outlining limitations in FAA § 7).
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See Ted Folkman, Case of the Day: ZF Automotive v. Luxshare, FOLKMAN LLC (2022),
https://folkman.law/2022/06/14/case-of-the-day-zf-automotive-v-luxshare/ (last visited Jun 22,
2022) (outlining reasons why investment treaty arbitration might well be governmental in nature);
Daniels and Scoville, supra note 24 (noting likelihood of future litigation on this point).
197
See ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, 2022 WL 2111355, at *9-10 (U.S.
June 13, 2022) (“None of this forecloses the possibility that sovereigns might imbue an ad hoc
arbitration panel with official authority.”)
198
See id. (reasoning ad hoc nature of panel took it out of the scope of governmental authority)
199
See Folkman, supra note 196 (noting need for further clarity on statute’s application to
investor-state disputes); Supreme Court Sharply Limits Federal District Courts’ Authority to Order
Discovery in International Arbitration Proceedings, NAT’L L’ REV., https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-sharply-limits-federal-district-courts-authority-to-order-discovery (last visited Jun 22, 2022) (same).
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broader range of institutions than conventional courts and governmental
agencies. ZF Automotive has clarified that a “tribunal” must have governmental authority, and that the liberalizing trend does not extend to private
arbitrations. The decision aligns with the history of private international
commercial arbitration. This was an uncommon form of dispute settlement
in 1964, meaning Congress likely did not have a specific intent toward it.
The decision also avoids conflict with the FAA.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly address efficiency in ZF Automotive, but the decision does respond to genuine concerns about delays
and costs arising from additional discovery in international arbitration. The
holding should allay some criticism of the increasing trend toward American-style discovery. The Court could have reiterated the Intel decision’s
guidance for district courts to exercise their discretion on § 1782 requests.
This discretion includes the ability to refuse requests in cases where the parties or the tribunal do not want the assistance. However, leaving each assessment wholly in the district courts’ discretion would have increased the
burden of § 1782 requests; under ZF Automotive, district courts need only
determine whether a tribunal is governmental, and may dismiss those that
are not. Questions still remain regarding how ZF Automotive will play out
in practice, but for now, it is at least clear that the district courts may not
provide discovery assistance for use in private international arbitration.
Niamh Gibbons

